The Science of Letters
Anna-Sophie Springer, Etienne Turpin
Published 21 June 2016
The Apparency of Evidence
It cannot be said that the matters of science are uncertain just because they abound with quarrels and controversies.
—
Spinoza, Ethics, 1677
This essay considers how the ethical and
epistemological confusions apparent in the private reflections of European
naturalists of the nineteenth century suggest an alternative history of
colonial science and its long-presumed positivist trajectory. By attending to some
lesser-known letters, exchanges, notebooks, and ephemera found among the
well-ordered annals of natural history, our aim is to delineate a minor history of uncertainty. This
attempt is not simply a matter of correcting the historical record, nor is it
an effort to
exonerate those responsible for developing or implementing typically violent
programs of colonial expansion, whether by way of cartography, collections, or
other means of empire and publicity. Instead, by mapping a minor history of
uncertainty throughout the Indonesian archipelago, and by traversing the torrid
zone alongside several figures in pursuit of new knowledge to bring back to Europe,
our aim is to trouble an image of science which continues to obstruct environmental justice in the present.1 Simply put, we believe
that the enduring image of science as an enterprise committed to a positivist
clarification of knowledge through the elimination of any ethical friction or moral
doubt subverts contemporary climate change science and related inquiries into
biodiversity loss, mass extinction, and planetary toxicity.
Before
we consider European expeditions in the Indonesian archipelago and the various
expressions of the will to knowledge which these journeys reified in the
history of science, it is necessary to recount three more recent events that further
clarify the stakes of this history by exposing its pernicious if difficult-to-discern
legacy.
17
November 2009. In anticipation of the United
Nations Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC) set to be held in Copenhagen,
Denmark, in December 2009, the servers of the Climate Research Unit at the
University of East Anglia in Norwich, England, were attacked. Hackers copied
thousands of files, documents, and emails, then leaked them to various internet
sites for global distribution and commentary. The suggestion that the hack exposed
evidence of falsified climate data—thus proving climate change was an
orchestrated conspiracy—was thoroughly promoted by climate denialists,
including James Delingpole, executive editor for the London branch of the
Breitbart News Network, who first named the incident “Climategate.” That far-right
extremist, white supremacist, and conspiratorial media outlets could so thoroughly
leverage the incident to suggest that there was no scientific consensus on
anthropogenic climate change certainly requires further discussion; however, our
concern in this essay are the latent assumptions about scientific consensus
that the hack revealed.2 If the publics who read
about it online or
in the mainstream press, or saw it televised on cable news networks, had a
greater appreciation for the subjective uncertainties that constitute the real
work of science, instead of the positivist image of decisive objectivity, would
there have been a controversy at all? Even when we admit the role played by
climate denialists in falsely extrapolating scientific conspiracy theories from
the hacked data of the Climate Research Unit, it is evident that non-scientific
communities could be better inoculated against such flagrant falsehoods if they
shared a more sensitive and dynamic image of science. Which is to say: a
post-positivist image of science wherein uncertainty on one stratum does not
prevent consensus on another would be an essential component of the aesthetics
of evidence in the Anthropocene.3
22 April 2017. From the March for
Science homepage: “In more than 600 cities around the world, we marched as an
unprecedented coalition of organizations and individuals. We marched because
science is critical to our health, economies, food security, and safety. We
marched to defend the role of science in policy and society.”4 It is essential to
acknowledge that the need to “march for science” in 2017 might have seemed
unnecessary were it not for the inauguration of the new President of the United States,
Donald J. Trump, in January of the same year. That “science,” as a mode of
inquiry, now requires public demonstrations in a manner that was until very
recently the purview of social movements is a rather startling indicator of the
apparency of evidence in the era of Trump.5 While the Trump White
House promoted homegrown “alt-truths” on issues from U.S. health care and
taxation to veterans affairs and missile launches, the disconcerting deletion
of climate change information and related public data sources from government
websites also helped to draw hundreds of thousands of marchers around the world
into the streets. “What do we want? Evidence-based policies! When do we want
them? After peer-review!” Amidst these unprecedented calls for the protection
of a properly scientific
evidentiary, what post-positivist image of science can we help co-produce? How
can we help ensure that the various pro-science reactions to Trump-era attacks avoid
simply reifying an image of science that undermines broader but no less urgent
questions about epistemological diversity, knowledge co-production, and the
social and environmental consequences of techno-scientific endeavors under
capitalism?6
17 February 2017. As Scott Pruitt assumed
his duties as the 14th Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) of the United States of America, the fact that as Attorney General of
Oklahoma he sued the EPA no fewer than fourteen times was not lost on America’s
scientific community. The EPA
was established in 1970 under an Executive Order from then-U.S. President
Richard Nixon, who saw the agency as a necessary extension of the federal
government that could help to protect human and environmental health. That
Trump would appoint a known climate skeptic and long-time industry advocate to head
the EPA signaled, in no uncertain terms, that the agency would be thoroughly
dismantled both in terms of providing evidence-based policy, as well as
upholding environmental legislation such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.
How, when facing such a severe attack on the scientists and their ability to
shape policy through research (not to mention research funding and global research collaborations), can a
history of ethical uncertaintycontribute to the self-defense of human and nonhuman worlds?
Indeed,
as climate change studies warn persistently of devastating trajectories for
human and nonhuman worlds alike, the Trump administration’s disposition toward scientific
research makes the current essay particularly untimely. In this moment of anti-science (as well as the industry-backed non-science, which has attempted
to undermine the integrity of public debate at least since the end of WWII),
alt-truths, and accelerating climate change, is it not more important than ever
to rally behind an image of science as an objective, incontrovertible,
collective human endeavor? While we acknowledge the increasing acrimony of thisapparent debate as well as ongoing
disputes between scientists and industry-backed researchers who intentionally
create doubts about valid scientific findings, we nevertheless believe that to
be drawn uncritically into such a binary weakens the power of collectives and communities
to respond effectively to attacks on their neighborhoods, their health, and their
variously constituted worlds.7 Neither Trump, nor Pruitt,
nor their climate change-denying supporters will be defeated by a neo-positivist
image of science because their matters of concern are not scientific; instead, what
is at stake is power.8 And, in the struggle
against racist, populist State-capitalism, its environmental violence, and its
life-threatening externalities which have been aggregating together in the
atmosphere since the beginning of the industrial revolution as planetary
climate change, a more powerful science is definitely not one still tricked by
a positivist promotional campaign. In his remarkable essay on the scientist and
engineer S.V. Seshadri, historian Shiv Visvanathan emphasizes the need to
transform the work of science itself, “to create a science that thought with
its hands, a science that was more sexual and sensual, a science that was sensitive
to suffering.”9This, in our estimation, is a science at
once worth fighting for and worth fighting with;
indeed, many examples of lithe, scientific practices are now proliferating as
the pressures for communities to defend themselves from the ravages of
capitalism become ever-more acute.10 In what follows, we
develop a minor history of uncertainty as a way to help describe what is at
stake in the suppression of non-positivist scientific sensitivities. To
reanimate a sensitive science for the Anthropocene, the colonial image of
science that still represents the will to knowledge as a triumphalist suppression
of doubt must also be decolonized; again, this is no strategy of exoneration,
but rather the necessary overcoming of a powerful image of science that not
only weakens our sensitivities in the present, but that never really was.
In
the intellectual shadow of scientific papers, which can only ever announce the
confident findings of an objective mode of inquiry, we find so many other
letters and notebooks that declare, sometimes emphatically and often in confused
or ambiguous terms, an altogether different affect. When we pay closer
attention to these uncertainties, it becomes clear that even the most confident
figures in the pantheon of modern science flinched when considering the ethical
implications of their work. As a man of social rank with deep connections to
the Church of England, Charles Darwin hesitantly pondered the danger of his
ideas about evolution; inevitably, he was aware of the potential accusations of
heresy his work might solicit from his fellow Victorians, confident as they
were about the unity of nature wherein every creature purposefully inhabited
its position within God’s unchanging master plan. Fifteen years before he would
agree to publishing On the Origin of
Species (1859), Darwin admitted his bad conscience about “presumptuously”
believing in species’ mutability to his colleague Joseph Hooker with the
parenthetical remark: “(it is like confessing a murder).”11 While Darwin’s concern
over the consequences of his ideas were well-founded, the history of scientific
letters suggests this concerned comportment is less of an aberration than it
might appear in the textbook accounts of the Great Men of Science. In fact, nagging doubts about the ethics and
implications of scientific research were a psychological condition familiar
among the colonial explorers and naturalists of the nineteenth century. But, if
Darwin’s concerns were keyed to the metaphysical structure of Victorian life,
the will to scientific knowledge in the colonial tropics raised a different set
of vexing questions about the environmental consequences of their inquiries.
Michel
Foucault, a philosopher more attentive to systems of thought than perhaps any
other in the twentieth century, once explained that the objective of philosophy
“is to render visible precisely what is visible, that is, to make appear that
which is so near, that which is so immediate, so immediately bound to ourselves
that we for that very reason do not perceive it.”12 In this estimation, “if
the role of science is to make known that which we don’t see, the role of
philosophy is to make us see what we see.”13 While these two
objectives are present among the trajectories of the will to knowledge that
Foucault describes in his inaugural lecture course at the Collège de France, it is
another, more ambivalent mode of evidence that we discover in circulation among
the letters of colonial naturalists in the Indonesian archipelago.14 If philosophy renders
visible what had been too
visible to see, and science brings to light what was previously beneath the
“threshold of detectability,”15 hallucinations are a part of that curious brand of revelation which
weaves together the seen and unseen by way of spectacular, networked patterns
of incorporeal connectivity.16 Among the European
dropouts who elected to find their fame and fortune on the shores of faraway
colonies, we discover the precise inversion of this revelatory phenomenon.
Instead of iridescent connections mending together the dimensions of apparent and latent
reality, the perceptions of colonial scientists are blurred by the recurrence
of “reverse hallucinations”—an expression borrowed from William Gibson by way
of Ricardo Dominguez—which occasion events of not seeing what is manifestly
present. Let us now turn to the torrid zone in the nineteenth century,
where we will quickly discover how the colonial segregation of subjective,
ethical life from the objectivity- oriented will to scientific knowledge both
encouraged and relied upon reverse-hallucinatory discrepancies between the obvious and the obscure.
Colonial Contours
You are free to conjure up an ecology, a demography, and a
geography that would be most favorable to the state and its ruler. What, in those
circumstances, would you design?
—
James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed (2010)
Among its vast collection, the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin (State Library of
Berlin) contains an original map of the geology of the
island of Java, published by Franz Wilhelm Junghuhn (1809–1864) in 1855. To
view this, the first comprehensive map of the world’s most populated island,
visitors can request an appointment online. After waiting several weeks, and upon
arriving at the library’s Maps Collection, it is then possible to unfold a three-meter-long
rendering of Java across several pristine library tables. The quality of the
production is compelling, awesome even. In a world dominated by Google Earth
and its military-grade resolution, the achievements of this mid-nineteenth-century
map are still irreproachable. The Perpustakaan Nasional di Indonesia (National
Library of Indonesia) in Jakarta also contains an original of Junghuhn’s map,
albeit the section profile included in the first volume of his publication Java, seine Gestalt, Pflanzendecke und
innere Bauart, published in 1852. Extending 153 centimeters, this foldout
illustration depicts all of the Indonesian island’s peaks, arranged from west
to east across its 1,000-kilometer length, at a ratio of 1:18.25.
In
Berlin, in order to view the map visitors must leave behind their ink pens upon
entering the research room. Inside, they must wear a pair of white flannel
gloves to further protect this precious document of colonization––heralded
among historians of cartography as a remarkable achievement––from any human
damage. In Jakarta, the tome containing the section map is passed over the librarian’s
counter; opening it to reveal the century-old lithograph, visitors are
confronted with numerous moldy stains, perpetually conjured by the tropical
humidity. The precarious state surely points to a lack of institutional funding
that would be necessary to preserve this century-old paper stock; but, when the
map begins to crumble as it is unfolded for viewing, its efficacy of a colonial
tool of power comes into question. What does it mean to witness the decay of
such a document in the place it once served to conquer? The history of
Junghuhn’s map and its attendant socio-spatial consequences helps to trace the
colonial contours that enabled the island of Java to become fully addressable
by its European occupiers. Because any cartographic addressability ultimately
expedites forms of violence typical of both historical and contemporary
imperialism, such endeavors must be understood as part of the colonial will to
science that renders legible and measurable the entangled territories of
tropical life.17
While various other cartographers
attempted to capture Java’s contours before and during the six years in which
Junghuhn produced his Javakaart,
these efforts were typically based on an awkward assemblage of incomplete
fragments. What distinguishes Junghuhn’s survey is the fact that he was the
sole cartographer to chart the horizontal expanse of the island in its
entirety. As a lover of the region’s high altitudes, he achieved this total and
totalizing image by climbing nearly all of Java’s peaks in order to measure and
triangulate the distances among the mountains in relation to two astronomically
determined points on the northern coast of Java, in the cities of Batavia and
Surabaya. He could then extrapolate their latitude and longitude in relation to
Greenwich, England. In addition to using compasses and a sextant, he employed a
barometer, which helped him to measure atmospheric pressure and thus altitudes
with remarkable accuracy.18
The stunning precision of Junghuhn’s
maps revolutionized geological and geographical knowledge of Java, then the
most important island in the most important colony occupied by the Netherlands:
more than a century would pass before these maps required any significant
updating through modern cartographic means.19 According to historian
Renate Sternagel, Junghuhn was ensnared in a contradictory position, pitting
the ambitions of his colonial employers against his own, formidable Romantic
ambition for personal freedom: “As a natural scientist Junghuhn loved untouched
nature, the ‘wilderness,’ and hated ‘civilization.’”20 At the same time, through
his work as surveyor and collector, “he embodied [...] the ideal of the
progressive-thinking colonial explorer, who played his part in taking measurements
of the world, as a forerunner for soldiers and planters.”21 It is worth emphasizing
that, at least in the context of scientific endeavor, the cartographic will to
knowledge coincides almost exactly with the colonial will to power. As in many
other cases, the map of Java served as an “imperialist weapon,”
determining
friends and enemies among those mapping and those being mapped.22
To fulfill the orders of
his employer, the Ministry of the Colonies, Junghuhn notably included in his
exceptional representation depictions of the coal repositories recently
discovered along the southern coast, as well as detailed information about the
island’s other valuable mineral deposits. To fully dominate this island and its
subsurface riches, however, it would first need to be more thoroughly
addressed.
The ambition to control a territory
for the purpose of extracting wealth from its human and nonhuman inhabitants has
been realized according to several characteristic maneuvers, not least of which
is the assignment of an address to those elements subject to control,
particularly subjects necessary for processes of capital accumulation.
Historian James C. Scott and theorist Benjamin H. Bratton have described the
processes associated with coercive legibility and involuntary addressability,
respectively, both of which help us understand more fully the role of island
cartography within the insurrectionary landscape of the Dutch East Indies
during the nineteenth century.
In
his account of legibility and simplification as trajectories of governance,
Scott describes the difference between a European medieval city or a Middle
Eastern medina and a gridded city
like Daniel Burnham’s Chicago or Georges-Eugène Hausmann’s Paris. While the former “enjoys at least a small
measure of insularity from outside intrusion,” for the latter, “the knowledge
of local citizens is not especially privileged vis-à-vis that of outsiders.”23 For Scott, these
settlement patterns suggest cognitive or epistemic islands. Describing medieval
Bruges, he writes: “Illegibility, then, has been and remains a reliable
resource for political autonomy.”24 As authorities attempted
to render territories governable, they aimed to make them and their populations
legible through mechanisms including, but not limited to, surnames, cadastral
maps, and traffic management. The question of how to address a subject of power
is consistently answered through this visual economy of politics. Or, as Scott
makes even more explicit, “modern statecraft is largely a project of internal
colonization, often glossed, as it is in imperial rhetoric, as a ‘civilizing
mission’.”25
Bratton
has recently updated this logic for the twenty-first century in his book The Stack.26 For him, the long arc of
legibility––from surnames to street addresses, postal codes to TCP/IP protocols––has
helped produce an “accidental megastructure.” He contends that, instead of
seeing all of these elements of planetary computation as “a hodgepodge of
different species of computing, spinning out on their own at different scales
and tempos, we should see them as forming a coherent and interdependent whole.
These technologies align, layer by layer, into something like a vast, if also
incomplete, pervasive if also irregular, software and hardware Stack.”27 Comprised of six
autonomous yet interdependent layers—Earth, Cloud, City, Address, Interface,
User—the Stack centrifugally spins out consequences in every direction and
dimension. For our purpose, it is Bratton’s thinking about addressability that
helps frame the stakes of Junghuhn’s colonial cartographic heroism, suggesting
its relevance for a contemporary reconsideration of the concept of the island
as such. Like Scott’s discussion of legibility and simplification, Bratton’s
layer of address within the Stack identifies various means by which data (and
their socio-spatial consequences) are measured and classified as a means for
their governance. Contrary to the popular belief in a free and fluid internet,
legibility-cum-addressability is even more consequential as the morphology of
sovereignty increasingly exhibits kaleidoscopic dematerializations,
virtualizations, physical reassertions, and material instantiations, that is,
as politics are simultaneously rendered through a transformative logic of
software. But, as Bratton argues, this transition is not only a matter of
interfaces or parameters; the power of addressability as a modality of
governance reaches back at least to the cartographic trajectory that subtends
the colonial-scientific will to knowledge.28
However,
in order to understand the project of mapping Java, it is necessary to first recall
the unstable landscape of the nineteenth-century Dutch East Indies, a site of
struggle already punctuated by centuries of revolt against European occupation.
The Javanese Prince Diponegoro is portrayed—famously or infamously, depending
on one’s affinities for rebellion—as the arrested figurehead of the guerilla
revolts that terrified Dutch rulers on Java in the 1820s.29 As the colonial
government repeatedly failed to prevent plague and famine across the island,
which had allegedly been placed under European rule in order to improve the
stifling human conditions suffered by native inhabitants, anticolonial
sentiment became pervasive.
As historian Gerhardt Aust observes,
the strategic importance of reliable maps for the Dutch military was given
particular urgency by the events of the Java War (1825–1830), when due to
insufficient geographical and topographical knowledge, the colonial army
suffered significant losses against Diponegoro’s guerillas.30 The rebellion was the
largest organized uprising against the Dutch since they had first colonized the
island in the early seventeenth century. Under the leadership of the
guerilla-prince from Yogyakarta, thousands of rice farmers left their fields in
Central Java to fight the Dutch. Local guerilla fighters had the upper hand for
the first two years of the confrontation, but the uprising was eventually
suppressed by tricking Diponegoro into a treacherous cease-fire, at which point
Dutch authorities shamelessly arrested him. An estimated 200,000 combatants
were dead by the end of the conflict, including more than eight thousand Dutch
soldiers and tens of thousands of Javanese civilians. If the colony was to be
maintained as a site of Dutch prosperity, a new approach to its governance
would be necessary.
Created
in the aftermath of the Java War, Junghuhn’s map dramatically diminished the
island’s insularity. Scott asserts that, “Historically, the relative
illegibility to outsiders of some urban neighborhoods (or of their rural
analogues, such as hills, marshes, and forests) had provided a vital margin of
political safety from control by outside elites.”31 In this context,
Junghuhn’s island map provided both evidence of the colonized territory and an
instrument for its further domination. It follows that, at the very moment Java
becomes cartographically addressable, it loses its naturally insular existence
within an ever-increasing imperial force field[AS1] .
Sternagel describes how, with the end of the Java War, Dutch rule was
re-stabilized and the island population was coerced into a system of highly
taxed agricultural labor, which lasted the ensuing 100 years, until the
beginning of the twentieth-century Independence movement.32
Junghuhn anxiously awaited news
about how his masterpiece was received by those who commissioned it; he, like so
many other Europeans scientists, aimed to please the masters who ruled at a
distance with the delivery of impressive scientific findings. No less
unexceptionally, Junghuhn also appears to have wandered from his original
mission, to the point of escaping the truth of its purpose altogether. The
commission of the Javakaart allowed
Junghuhn to retreat from the confines of colonial service; instead, he was free
to traverse Java’s majestic mountain peaks. Yet, he could not have failed to
recognize the value of the map for the future military occupation of the
island, even if it seems that he struggled to admit the gravity of his own role in environmental and
cultural destruction caused by the colonial project. In some instances, he
preferred to indict “the ‘indifference of the Javanese’ along with the increase
in local population and the rising demand for rice fields and firewood”33 as the main cause of
deforestation. On rarer occasions, however, one does find in his writing
explicit criticism of colonialist expansion:
Through
increasing population, and cultivation of the soil the beauty of nature is
destroyed. The magnificent flowering bushes, the grasslands alternating with
forests and home to so many living creatures, so attractive, so entertaining to
see—they are being crowded out by the land use systems predominant in central
Europe, by ugly monotonous fields, which one cannot look at without wishing to
get away as quickly as possible. This is the end of the song for which Nature
sacrificed herself.34
Still, as he surveyed the island, the pleasure of
such a pursuit—the pure act of mapping—seems to have largely obscured the
commitment to universal human freedom that occasionally appears in his
writings, including several essays in which he explicitly decries the colonial
occupation of the island and the violence of the Dutch authorities. While such ethical
sentiments indicate a potential, underlying ambiguity, even an uncertainty on
his part, they did not prevent Junghuhn from completing his task. Indeed, the map
was of such exceptional quality that, following its arrival in Europe, he
received a letter of praise from none other than Alexander von Humboldt. In a
letter dated 20 April 1857, the renowned naturalist remarked emphatically, “How
can I thank you enthusiastically enough for your beautiful, truly geological,
richly designed map. Following a military dinner, the King, Prince Friedrich of
the Netherlands, the Minister of War, as well as several other generals all
long admired it as very excellent work.”35 For decades to come,
Junghuhn’s cartographic synthesis of Java would serve as a tool of colonial
domination, guiding explicit military campaigns as well as resource extraction
and plantation management. In his wide-ranging study of “immersive” colonial
psychologies, philosopher Peter Sloterdijk summarizes the ethical paradox
succinctly: “Whoever draws the map behaves as if he were culturally,
historically, legally and politically in the right.”36 Although Junghuhn simply
could not have doubted the role his map would play in the project of colonial
conquest and its attendant deforestation, his reverse hallucinations among the
high peaks of Java allowed him to deny (at least, to himself) the inevitable
outcome of his scientific study; of course, the map of the island is not an
island.
The Climate of Deforestation
The advantage of thinking through
plantations is that the patchy Anthropocene is immediately apparent.
— Anna Tsing, “Earth
Stalked by Man” (2016)
In addition to subsequent cartographic
surveys and a variety of measurements recorded at the request of other German scientists,
Junghuhn’s research unfolded according to several additional governmental
mandates he had received from the Dutch, both of which concerned trees. In 1856, he was asked to oversee the development
of cinchona plantations, a South American tree species, which Alexander von
Humboldt and Aimé Bonpland had first described for Western medicinal science in
the course of their expedition fifty years earlier (1799–1804). The healing
value of cinchona bark as a fever treatment had been known to Amerindian
peoples for centuries, but the cultivation of chinchona trees had since become a
key aspect of colonial occupations in the Eastern hemisphere because the bark’s
extractable substance quinine provided a much-needed treatment for malaria.37 The second official assignment involved an investigation of the “degree, state,
and extent” of deforestation on Java by comparing the state of the island to previously
conducted surveys. This latter task is noteworthy as it led Junghuhn to study
and then speculate on the relationship between deforestation, rainfall, and the
water depth of creeks and rivers, ultimately leading to his hypothesis that
climate change would be an inevitable consequence of deforestation.
Some of his more prescient observations
are relayed in another letter to von Humboldt, dated 8 December 1856, in which
Junghuhn describes woodlands that “have been notably cleared, even here in the
well-wooded western highlands of the island.” The formerly overflowing
riverbeds were now “found to be
almost dry, leading to the non-irrigation of a large part of the Sawahs.”
38
Junghuhn then explains his understanding of the relationship between forests,
fluvial water levels, and the intensity of the winds, particularly the “West
Monsoon” from the Indian Ocean and what he calls the “good and dry Monsoon”
coming from Australia. Much in resonance the systemic correlations between
deforestation and human-induced climate change Humboldt himself deduced from
his observations in South America, Junghuhn’s hypothesis is that deforestation
will not only cause additional droughts, but greater differences among the
various types of wind, thereby transforming the regional climate. Anticipating
the emergence of extreme weather conditions produced through deforestation,
Junghuhn then speculates:
I
believe that it won’t be easy to prove a decrease of rainfall during the West
Monsoon […] as being caused by the deforestation of certain areas; as well as
proving that the droughts during the so-called good and dry Monsoon […] will
become intensified as a consequence of the deforestation of some areas, which
will first lead to stronger contrasts between the monsoon weather conditions as
well as produce extremes; one example being the good monsoon of 1855 where, in
Batavia and many other areas on Java, not one raindrop fell for seven months.39
While
Junghuhn goes on to note that this claim requires a more “fully and carefully” conducted
investigation of the entire island of Java, in his conclusion he nevertheless argues
that new trees must be methodically planted to avoid this regional climate
change; to insist on his point, he also provides a list of eligible species.40 Junghuhn’s early
admonishments regarding colonial land-use transformation can still be heard—if only
as an echo that continues to be ignored—in contemporary reports about drought-stricken
rice fields, drinking water shortages, landslides, and severe flooding
occurring as a result of deforestation and attendant terrestrial transformations,
especially the expansive new oil palm plantations in Borneo, Sumatra, and West
Papua.41 Without forests, the heavy
rainfalls of the monsoon season can no longer be absorbed into the ground; this
excess water regularly inundates villages and cities, while also expediting the
loss of topsoil as it is washed away into the sea.
Given his role in the cartographic subjugation of Java, it
might strike the contemporary reader as especially contradictory when Junghuhn articulates
deep frustrations over colonial projects that necessitate further deforestation.
Importantly, his conception of the forest, and of nature itself, remains
grounded in a Romantic vision that is at once sublime and spiritual: “The first
impression mandated silence, similar to the kind one inevitably loses oneself
in upon suddenly entering, from a brightly sun-lit street, into the sanctuary
of a highly vaulted, gothic church.”42 At times, Junghuhn’s reveries come remarkably close to those of his fellow
German, Friedrich Nietzsche, whose obsession with mountain peaks as an image
for free thought would culminate, forty years later, with Zarathustra dancing
in the clear air of these heights, far from the masses who could not undergo
his call for a “transvaluation of values.”43 Similarly, Junghuhn writes:
How satisfied, how light in spirit can one rest in these
heights, while the wind sighs softly through
the Casuarina pines and the stars twinkle through the light green vault of the shelter. No heavy roof of tiles hides from
us the friendly view of the heavens, no heavy ceiling
presses down on us from above, no gloomy walls confine us, one breathes freely and lightly above the heavy atmosphere of the
lowlands, where—in dark caves they call
houses—live people suspicious, small-minded, and confined.44
In fact,
Junghuhn’s tropical “paradise” exists exclusively among the high altitudes of
Java, far away from the “suspicious, small-minded, and confined” aspects of
colonial society that his cartography helped to develop. It is evident that the
geographical distance separating the free, high mountains from the colonial
enterprise on the plains below was, at the same time, a psychological schism that
allowed Junghuhn to parse his conflicting, schizoscopicview of colonization.
The fragility of this
geo-psychological division is exemplified by an episode that took place in 1839.
In the spring of that year, Junghuhn explored the area around the Gunung Gedeh;
at the peak, he discovered what he describes as a peaceful and fertile meadow
with a freshwater creek, mushrooms, small flowers, and numerous traces of the wild
rhinoceros of West Java. He was also delighted to encounter a primula which he
had discovered a few weeks earlier—later named Primula imperialis Jungh.—when he climbed Mount Pangrango, a 3,000-meter-tall
extinct volcano also located along the Sunda Arc. Reflecting on these
experiences, Junghuhn compares the picturesque summit to a “castle built into
the clouds.”45 Towards the end of the year,
he again ascended Gedeh to the summit, but the area had changed drastically. No
longer a secluded haven, the area was now, so he notes, overrun by
undernourished Javanese workers building colonial infrastructure. Shocked by
this encounter, he begins to realize that it was his own report about the
fertile land that led to its destruction. Full of nostalgia for the lost
paradise (if not guilt), he remarks: “Wistfully I left this beautiful summit;
wistful for seeing how many of its solitary blossoms had already been crushed,
and how many a small, beautiful tree had to fall to the axe, since the short
time that I had first made this place known in Buitenzorg.—A significant
expanse of its lovely forest […] had already been hopelessly mowed down.”46 While deforestation in
Indonesia’s rain and peat forests continues unabated to this day, we are compelled
to reflect on these statements from an earlier colonial period because they
reveal a more general
pattern that characterizes the will to knowledge.
Fig. 02. F.W. Junghuhn’s “Kaart van het Eiland Java.” Breda: A.J. Bogaerts, 1855. Scale 1:35,000; format 79 × 308 cm. Courtesy of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin —Preußischer Kulturbesitz.
Despite occasional
lamentations, and even while predicting severe consequences such as climate
change, it is evident that Junghuhn suppressed his ethical uncertainties in
order to execute his colonial duties in the name of science. But was this
science in name only?47 Would Junghuhn’s practice have differed if his research was articulated
in a non-positivist scientific context? This is an extremely difficult
question, tending as it does toward a severe anachronism; fundamentally, we
cannot answer it directly. Yet, what we want to stress through this question is
that Junghuhn’s doubt, his recurring uncertainty about the colonial project,
and his intuitive concerns about climate change, were all subsumed under an
image of positivist technoscience that connected a colonial political economy,
field observation, and scientific measurement in an inescapable loop of socioenvironmental
violence. Even while reveling in the freedom he was afforded by the many high
summits of the Javanese mountains, he ultimately refused to see how his
observations would condemn the human and nonhuman inhabitants living below to
brutal forms of colonization. But, even if it is obvious that his tropical paradise
could not be sustained through the colonial observations which almost
immediately mandated its eradication, could such a paradise at least be
collected?
Collecting Paradise
There was
no seeing everything at once: no certainty.
—
Ursula K. Le Guin, The Word for World is
Forest (1972)
Between 1854
and 1862, the British naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace explored the Malay
Archipelago, ardently documenting the region’s geography and biodiversity while
amassing a enormous collection of specimens for museums in Europe. His
fieldwork, findings, and personal experiences are chronicled in the book The Malay Archipelago: The land of the
orang-utan, and the bird of paradise—A narrative of travel, with sketches of
man and nature, published in 1869 following Wallace’s return to Europe. The
complex relationship between the will to knowledge and the gathering of
scientific data is illustrated in part by the unfathomable scale of Wallace’s
collection of natural history specimens. As a young man in his early twenties, he
had come across the controversial, anonymously published Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, which first ignited
his fascination with the heretical idea that organisms might change their form
over time; while the notion provoked in Wallace a plan for future research, the
suggestion that species’ transmutationcould explain the natural efflorescence was rigorously opposed by Charles
Lyell, Britain’s preeminent geologist.48 Committed to understanding
first-hand this complex problem of morphological development, together with his
friend and fellow “beetle-hunter” Henry Bates, Wallace planned for a collecting
expedition to the Amazon Basin, which would occupy him from 1848 to 1852. The South
American tropics were fecund region for an extensive study of evolution;
indeed, as Wallace noted in a pre-departure letter to Bates: “I should like to
take some one family to study thoroughly––principally with a view to the theory
of the origin of species.”49 Yet, even after Wallace filled his notebooks with detailed reports, sketches of
plants and animals, and maps—all of which produced a preliminary basis for
understanding biogeographical distribution in the Amazon—his groundbreaking
scientific revelation would have to be deferred.50 While he was returning to
Europe aboard the Helen, after twenty-six
days at sea, the brig’s cargo caught fire and the vessel was abandoned; Wallace
lost nearly everything he had painstakingly collected and recorded.
Two years later—still convinced that he would be
able to solve the problems of natural selection, geographical distribution, and
variations in plant and animal life only if he could gather an original
collection that would be as varied and comprehensive as possible—Wallace would try
again to solve the riddle of species transmutation, this time in Southeast
Asia. During his eight years in the Malay Archipelago, he sent back to England
an amazing 125,660 specimens of natural history, among them five thousand
species hitherto unknown to science. While many of these were sold to private
collections and museums, Wallace kept for himself approximately three thousand
bird-skins (including roughly one thousand different species), as well as
twenty thousand beetle and butterfly specimens.51 The sale of these specimens allowed Wallace to pay for his travels and, after
his return to Europe, he was able to use his personal collection to continue
thinking through various questions of evolutionary biology.52 The following passage from an essay published one year after the expedition, “On
the Physical Geography of the Malay Archipelago,” explains Wallace’s rationale for
pursuing a “perfect collection”:
[The naturalist] looks upon every
species of animal and plant now living as the individual letters which go to make
up one of the volumes of our earth’s history; and, as a few lost letters may
make a sentence unintelligible, so the extinction of the numerous forms of life
which the progress of cultivation inevitably entails
will necessarily render obscure this invaluable record of the past. It is
therefore, an important object, which
governments and scientific institutions should immediately take steps to
secure, that in all tropical countries colonised by Europeans the most perfect
collections possible in every branch of natural history should be made and
deposited in national museums, where the may be available for study and interpretation.53
As a “site” for scientific study, the awesome biodiversity of the
archipelago is still evident in more contemporary estimations. According to
Gavan Daws and Marty Fujita, “in almost all plant and animal taxa, Indonesia
has levels of species diversity and endemism that rank within the highest in
the world.” Absolute quantitative measures of the world’s biodiversity remain difficult
to achieve, but it has been estimated that Wallace was exposed to “more than
ten thousand species of trees, about a tenth of the world’s flowering plant
species, about an eighth of all mammal species, nearly a sixth of all reptile
and amphibian species, a sixth of all bird species, and about a third of all
fish species.”54
Until just a few decades ago, one could still encounter many of the lush
forest landscapes in Southeast Asia that led to Wallace’s two most important
publications. First, in 1855, he wrote “On the
Law which has Regulated the Introduction of New Species,” which he published in
the Annals and Magazine of Natural
History in September of the same year. The conclusions of what came to be known
as “The Sarawak Law” are a key in the development of a theory of evolution by
natural selection: “Every species has come into existence coincident both in
space and time with a closely allied species.”55 The second publication, which has a more
complicated reception, also indicates the significance of Indonesian
biodiversity in the development of the theory of evolution. Ternate > Wallace > Lyell >
Darwin. On 1 July
1858, the so-called “Darwin-Wallace” paper was read at the Linnean Society in
London after Wallace sent a letter to Darwin (via Charles Lyell) in which the
former claimed to have discovered the mechanism of evolution in the process of
“natural selection.”56 The paper was officially published by the Society on 20 August 1858; Darwin’s
monograph On the Origin of Species followed
on 24 November 1859. Many prominent authors have developed careful and
considered reflections on Wallace’s contribution to the theory of evolution by
natural selection; our ambition is to advance a reading of the will to
knowledge as it is instantiated in Wallace’s estimation of the natural world (and
the consequences of its degradation) through the development practices at the
core of the colonial project.57
As a result of logging, forest fires, agricultural
clearing, open-pit mining, road construction, and oil palm plantations, many of
the areas which afforded Wallace the living evidentiary of evolution have all
but disappeared. In fact, it is now estimated that within a decade,
ninety-eight percent of the Indonesian rainforest will be destroyed completely
if developments remain on a business-as-usual trajectory.58 When we asked evolutionary biologists whether or not they believed it would
still be possible to develop the theory of evolution, or biogeographical
distribution, based on a collection of specimens from the Malay Archipelago
today, most answered in the negative. According to our interlocutors, animal and
plant species have been radically displaced, and many are now present on
islands where they would not have been found in Wallace’s time. Thus, as a result of various
anthropogenic factors, the species’ scrambled and often precarious appearance
in the devastated forests of the archipelago means that the story they tell today
is of a very different “nature.”59
Still, Wallace was not immune to the
realities of land-use transformation in the region, even if these changes were much
less destructive in his time than they are among contemporary plantation
developments. In one appraisal, Wallace remarked:
Future ages will certainly look back upon us as a people
so immersed in the pursuit of wealth as to be blind to higher considerations.
They will charge us with having culpably allowed the destruction of some of those
records of Creation which we had it in our power to preserve; and while
professing to regard every living thing as the direct handiwork and best
evidence of a Creator, yet, with a strange inconsistency, seeing many of them
perish irrecoverably from the face of the earth, uncared for and unknown.60
For Wallace, the blindness of the colonial project
and its inevitable destruction of nature makes the entire scientific enterprise
culpable because “we had it in our
power to preserve” [authors’ emphasis] these so-called “records of Creation.”
Such an ecclesiastical image of nature may seem odd, especially given that
Wallace’s own writing helped to displace the belief that nature was the work of
a divine creator. However, as anthropologist
Anna Tsing has suggested in her book Friction,
this idyllic image may still be of strategic importance: “The romance of nature
gives grandeur and autonomy to the natural world; those who appreciate that
grandeur are also able to feel the shock of nature’s desecration and
destruction. Is it possible, I wondered, that, even in Indonesia, the romance
of nature is one important route to an appreciation of nature’s fragility?”61 What, then, of
Wallace’s ambition for a perfect
collection, which seems to express simultaneously a deep appreciation of nature and a resignation that,
through the very act of this collection, the scientist participates in a
process that will end in destruction?
Nowhere is this vexing, schizoscopicperspective on colonial collecting more pronounced than in Wallace’s description
of the birds of paradise.62 While these remarkable birds were known in Europe at least since the
Renaissance, they had arrived there in the form of lifeless skins; curiously,
because these skins showed no osteological evidence of their hindlimbs, legend
had it that they lived in the sky and never landed on earth except to die. Thus,
Wallace was proud to proclaim himself the first Englishman to ever see birds of
paradise alive in their terrestrial habitat. He even succeeded, against all
odds, in transporting two living birds to London where he hoped the domestic
aviaries of the Crystal Palace or Kew Gardens would allow them to survive in
captivity. Paradoxically, it is the experience of beholding their natural
beauty in the wild that inspired Wallace to deliver one of his most confounding
statements on extinction, which he narrates near the end of The Malay Archipelago:
I thought of the long ages of the past, during which the
successive generations of this little creature had run their course—year by
year being born, and living and dying amid these dark and gloomy woods with no
intelligent eye to gaze upon their loveliness; to all appearance such a wanton
waste of beauty. Such ideas excite a feeling of melancholy. It seems sad that
on the one hand such exquisite creatures should live out their lives and
exhibit their charms only in these wild, inhospitable regions, doomed for ages
yet to come to hopeless barbarism; while on the other hand, should civilized
man ever reach these distant lands, and bring moral, intellectual and physical
light into the recesses of these virgin forests, we may be sure that he will so
disturb the nicely-balanced relations of organic and inorganic nature as to
cause the disappearance, and finally the extinction, of these very beings whose
wonderful structure and beauty he alone is fitted to appreciate and enjoy.63
What to make
of such a troubling, hallucinatory adumbration today? Is this
not the very melancholy that natural history collections and their attendant
museological presentations are meant to neutralize?
Traditionally referred to as manuk dewata (“God’s birds”), it is
their second Malay appellation, burung
mati (“dead birds”), which expresses the cruel irony of their fate as symbols
of an expulsion from paradise. There is now no doubt that human activities,
including the fanatical consumption of fossil fuels, industrialized
agriculture, bioengineering, resource extraction, global waste management, and
pollution have violently disturbed Wallace’s “nicely-balanced relations of
organic and inorganic nature.” Direct forms of consumption also played their
part in this irreversible bioturbation;
only a few decades after Wallace left Southeast Asia, the trade in exotic avifauna
saw export numbers reach annual highs of up to 80,000 bird of paradise skins,
most of which arrived in Europe to adorn luxury items such as women’s hats. Such
activities caused a far-reaching conflict among residents and colonial
authorities that lasted for nearly forty years and resulted in a 1931 prohibition
against killing the birds; the debates over the preservation of habitats for birds
of paradise are thus said to mark the start of environmental politics in
Indonesia.64
Wallace’s
narrative in the Anthropocene, as with Junghuhn’s, trouble any simple inheritance
of the colonial will to knowledge. If the acquisition of knowledge by way of
colonial collecting was, according to Wallace, indelibly connected to an
inevitable process of extinction, how might we reconcile such scientific
ambitions with the demand for an ethical disposition that could contest such
violent eventualities? On this point, we concur with the philosopher of science
Michel Serres when he writes, “We are embarked on an irreversible economic,
scientific, and technological adventure; one can regret the fact, and even do
so with skill and profundity, but that’s how it is, and it depends less on us
than on what we have inherited from our
history.”65
Inheritance& Intrusion
The instant of nature forming between them drained every
drop from the walls of his life leaving behind just ghosts rustling like an old map.
—
Anne Carson, Autobiography of Red (1998)
As Brazilian architect Paulo Tavares has
presciently observed, “different regimes of power will produce different
natures, for nature is not natural; it is the product of cultivation, and more
frequently, of conflict.”66 So it was at the close of
the nineteenth century when another German naturalist, Ernst Haeckel, arrived
in Southeast Asia; his personal impressions of the expedition are documented inAus Insulinde: Malayische Reisebriefe (1901) and the three-volume Wanderbilder (1904), all of which contain descriptive texts, photographs, and numerous
watercolors. The main objective of Haeckel’s trip was to continue his research into
various radiolaria, medusae, and siphonophorae, not to seek out the so-called “Java Man,” the
discovery of which he had predicted in the 1860s, following the publication of
Darwin’s Origin.67 In his varied reflections on Java, Haeckel does indeed defend the idea of man
and ape descending from a shared, extinct primate origin, and maintains that
such a theory is already canonical. Although he is not in search of evidence
for this “missing link,” he notes that the ability to study the remaining
“anthropomorphs” is nevertheless extremely valuable, proceeding to then give an
account of a walk he took with a baby orangutan in Singapore’s botanical
garden. In this excruciating narrative of colonial racism, he also describes a friendship
between the orangutan and a nine-year-old Malay boy, which, in his view, could
be attributed to the fact that “the lower races” (i.e. Malayans) share a close
evolutionary proximity to great apes. Later, he even suggests that Malays could
best be understood as an “amphibian human race” because they enjoy fishing and living
on boats.68
The consequences of such racist ethnographic research are well known
after the genocides of the twentieth century; it is our concern to examine the
less explicit yet violent inheritance of colonial nature.69 For such a review, a final story from Haeckel’s expedition will suffice. In the
late fall of 1900, the naturalist visited Buitenzorg’s institute of botany, at
the foot of Gunung Gedeh. Following his ascent, it is notable how the fertile
plateau was still capable of stirring delight, as it once had done for Junghuhn
sixty years before. But Haeckel’s encounter was no longer with wild, tropical
nature; instead, the vegetation was supplanted by an image of neatly cultivated
colonial plots. Haeckel found no trace of the once abundant rhinoceros, only
emerald green, terraced rice fields. He noted, “It is especially through the
numerously scattered villages (kampongsor dessas) surrounded by orchards and
surmounted by the canopies of palm trees that the friendly impression obtains a
highly painterly charm.”70 The area was completely
changed, which is to say, colonized. The
imported fruit saplings from Europe that once traumatized Junghuhn—even if it
was his own report that led to their planting—had now successfully taken root,
giving the site a harmonious appearance of a cultivated, but no less abundant, tropical
nature. How should we read this colonial inheritance? If Haeckel could so
casually apprehend the colonization of the landscape as an objective fact of
nature, or at least as an indication of the successful management of nature
under the Dutch, how might we, in the Anthropocene, begin reassembling the various
natures which are now entirely subsumed under a system of
Integrated World Capitalism?71
One approach would
involve a reconsideration of the act of scientific observation itself. In a startling
footnote meant to summarize the consequences of the German forestry industry on
tropical nature, historian James Scott makes an exceptional comment about the results of reverse hallucinations. Referencing
Werner Karl Heisenberg, the theoretical physicist best known for his treatment
of the problem of uncertainty in
scientific observation, Scott notes that the colonial will to knowledge
produces a stultifying transformation.
Fig. 03. European scientists holding a white sheet to provide contrast while
photographing
a coffee plant, Buitenzorg Botanical Garden, Bogor, Java, circa 1900.
Image from the exhibition 125,660 Specimens of Natural History, Komunitas Salihara Gallery, Jakarta, 2015. Courtesy of the Indonesian Institute of Science.
“Instead of altering the phenomenon
observed through the act of observation, so that the pre-observation state of
the phenomenon is unknowable in principle,” Scott suggests that, “the effect of
(uninterested) observation in this case is to alter the phenomenon in question
over time so that it, in fact, more closely resembles the stripped down,
abstract image the lens had revealed.”72 From this perspective, Haeckel’s view is a post-observationalsummary of colonization; that is, as the latest observer, he sees only the
results of what his predecessors produced through their reverse hallucinations, culminating in an image of the colony as nature itself.
A
second approach to reassembling the natural, which we would like to propose
here, returns us to the claim with which we began—namely, that the enduring image
of science as an enterprise committed to a positivist clarification of
knowledge through the elimination of any ethical friction or moral doubt, subverts
contemporary inquiries into climate change and related forms of environmental
violence. How exactly does the history of the colonial will to knowledge in the
tropics evince such a concern? As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have noted,
“Their cultivated
individualism and voluntarism may seem diametrically opposed to self-effacing
objectivity, but, in fact, subjectivity and objectivity defined poles of the
same axis of the will: the will asserted (subjectivity) and the will restrained
(objectivity)—the latter by a further assertion of will.”73 The suppression of ethical concerns by way of these subjectivation processes required
by positivist colonial scientific practices form the historical preface to the
Anthropocene. How to best describe this suppression and its irruptive albeit minor
history of uncertainty?
The
inimitable philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers has recently reoriented the
discussion of the Anthropocene with her claim that what is now being witnessed—whether
under the flag of the Anthropocene, climate change, or the generalized
anthropogenic disturbance of the world and its many worlds—might be best
described as the intrusion of Gaia.74 As Stengers writes, “Gaia
is neither Earth ‘in the concrete’ and nor is it she who is named and invoked
when it is a matter of affirming and of making our connection to this earth
felt, of provoking a sense of belonging where separation has been predominant,
and of drawing resources for living, struggling, feeling, and thinking from
this belonging. It is a matter here of thinking intrusion, not belonging.”75 She continues, “The
intrusion of this type of transcendence, which I am calling Gaia, makes a major
unknown, which is here to stay, exist
at the heart of our lives. This is perhaps what is most difficult to
conceptualize: no future can be foreseen in which she will give us back the
liberty of ignoring her. […] We will have to go on answering for what we are
undertaking in the face of an implacable being who is deaf to our
justifications.”76 Within this study of reverse hallucinations, the intrusion of Gaia requires one
additional clarification.
Fig. 04. Watercolor by Ernst Haeckel of Gunung Salak near Buitenzorg, Java. Plate from his book Wanderbilder: Die Naturwunder der Tropenwelt Ceylon und Insulinde. Gera-Untermhaus:
W. Koehlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1904.
Stenger’s
intrusion “at the heart of our lives” cannot, we are sure, come solely from the
outside; indeed, if there anything is to be taken away from this essay, it is
that we, all of us—scientists, critics,
and curators alike—are of Gaia and
thus carry her “inside” of us as much as she (much more evidently) carries us. From
this perspective, Gaia is at least as much an erratic, disruptive
neuroecological force as she is an environmental, planetary-scaled macrophenomenon
beyond our apprehension. 77 To think the irrepressible force of ethical comportment
among entities—in spite of and
against the positivist technoscientific assemblage that helped fashion our
colonial naturalist predecessors—we do not require an idealized moral universality,
nor any subject-centric consciousness-raising. Instead, to think the intrusion
of Gaia upon the “heart of our lives,” through each and every act of inquiry, would
mean to rediscover, in this soiled and often repulsive legacy of the will to
knowledge, a line of flight that is both ofand for Gaia.78 Emboldened by this minor
history, why would we continue to assign to a science worthy of the name a
repressive function in relation to such constituent intrusions? As Déborah
Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro have contended in their own reading of
Stengers’ Gaia provocation, “the relation between humanity and the world can
begin to be thought as the relation connecting the one side of a Möbius strip
to itself: as a non-orientable figure in which the inseparability of thought
and being, animate and inanimate, culture and nature is […] a complete and real
consubstantiality or oneness, precisely like the surface of the Möbius strip.”79 Emphatically, for Danowski
and Viveiros de Castro, this is possible because, “Humanity and the world are literally on the same side; the
distinction between the two terms is arbitrary and impalpable: if one starts
from humanity (thought, culture, language, the “inside”) one necessarily
arrives at the world (being, matter, nature, the “Great Outdoors”) without crossing any border and
conversely.”80 In the kaleidoscopic profusion of nature that characterizes the tropics,
invasive moments of uncertainty could be mistaken for some fractured European morality,
but such a reductive account would fail to articulate a politics of scientific
inquiry. Instead, the irruption of Gaia as neuroecological
dissonance (leading to the proliferation of reverse hallucinations as attempts
to neutralize such psychoturbations)
can be understood as a confrontation—at once psychological and
ecological—between thinking-being inand of nature as such. What is required
of non-positivist scientific practice inand for the Anthropocene is therefore
the cultivation of an intimacy with the “section of chaos” under consideration,
which is as “internal” to the process of subjectivation as it is disruptive to any
long-feigned objectivity.81
The
American artist Catherine Lord has also explored the effect of tropical light
on white men and their attendant justifications for violent, hallucinatory
programs in the torrid zone.82 Following Lord, there seems
to be an equatorial effect that led European men of science to egregiously
double-down on their epistemic efforts among the tropical islands under colonial
possession during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We can use the
neologism heliopsychosis to precisely
name this effect, specifically in order to make an essential link between
exposure to the tropical solar zenith—with its excessive clarity among the high
peaks and shape-shifting edges of its watery archipelago—and the will to
knowledge that blinded the colonial naturalists laboring under this potent star
as they surveilled a transgressive and puzzling equatorial abundance. While we
are certain this colonial disposition cannot (and should not) be reduced to any
kind of meterological determinism, the
frequency and consistency of reverse
hallucinations in the tropics is indisputable. Thus, as the planet
continues to warm, and as the tropics begin to spread perilously toward the
temperate zones of the Earth, this phenomenon might be worth thinking—in our sciences as much as ourselves—because
our neuroecological disposition to the new
weather will have considerable bearing on the hospitality we might extend toward
such intrusions.83
Virginia Woolf was no stranger to this uncanny climatic inflection: “Whatever
the sun touched took on a fanatical existence.84
As the accelerating
build-up of atmospheric greenhouse gases fervently amplifies sublunar fanaticisms,
we might do well by attending more closely to the hallucinatory, positivist paroxysms
that accompanied colonialists as they tried to apprehend the vexing
multiplicity we call archipelago.
1 On the philosophical consequences of such “images,” and the “image of thought” in particular, see Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 129–67.
2 On the dangers of disinformation strategies like those related to “Climategate,” see Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis, Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online (New York: Data & Society Research Institute, 2017).
3 On the “aesthetics of evidence,” see Eyal Weizman et al., eds., Forensis: The Architecture of Public Truth (Berlin: Forensic Architecture and Sternberg Press, 2014) and Eyal Weizman, Forensic Architecture: Violence at the Threshold of Detectability (New York: Zone Books, 2017). For a discussion of climate data friction, see Paul N. Edwards, A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2010).
4 March for Science, https://satellites.marchforscience.com.
Fig. 05. Truckloads of oil palm fruits being delivered to a crude palm oil mill in the
Bengkulu area, Sumatra, Indonesia. Photo by the authors, 2014.